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OPINION OF THE COURT
                    
FUENTES, Circuit Judge
The case before us consists of two consolidated appeals arising out of the same set
of facts.  In 2001, two sections of a pier at the Beckett Street Marine Terminal (the
“Terminal”) located on the Delaware River in Camden, New Jersey, and owned by the
South Jersey Port Corporation (“SJPC”), collapsed.  SJPC contends that pile driving that
was taking place at a construction site upstream created an underwater landslide that led
4directly to the collapse of the pier sections.  The upstream construction site involved work
by a number of different entities, including S.T. Hudson Engineers, Inc. (“Hudson”) as
the engineer; Weeks Marine, Inc. (“Weeks”) as the company employed to conduct the
pile driving; and Hill International, Inc. (“Hill”) as the construction manager. 
At the time of the collapses, the pier was insured by Lexington Insurance
Company (“Lexington”).  The insurance policy in question was an all-risks policy and
required Lexington to cover the replacement value of the pier, with a maximum limit of
$15 million.  SJPC originally filed a claim with Lexington for the replacement value of
the piers, which it claimed exceeded the $15 million limit, on the theory that the pier
sections had collapsed due to the pile driving at the Memorial Pier site.  When Lexington
denied the claim,  SJPC brought a declaratory judgment action against Lexington. 
While the declaratory judgment action was pending, SJPC brought an action in
Superior Court against Hudson, Weeks Marine, and Hill, again asserting that the damage
to the pier was caused by pile driving performed by Weeks.  In response, Weeks filed an
action in the District Court of New Jersey, seeking the protection of the Limitation of
Vessel Owner’s Liability Act (“Limitation Act”), 46 U.S.C. App. § 181, et seq. (current
version at 46 U.S.C. § 30501, et seq.).  The District Court subsequently stayed the
Superior Court action.
The declaratory judgment action was settled for $7.3 million.  The settlement
represented “full and final payment under the Policy for all losses and/or claims arising
out of the collapses.”  (App. 1525-29).  As part of this settlement, Lexington agreed to
5assign back to SJPC the subrogation rights under the policy.  Those rights would have
allowed Lexington to sue the alleged tortfeasors in the shoes of SJPC.
SJPC continued its action against Hudson, Weeks Marine, and Hill, filing an
affirmative counterclaim with its answer that repeated the allegations brought in the
original Superior Court complaint.  Weeks Marine moved to dismiss SJPC’s strict
liability cause of action, asserting that federal maritime law preempts state law and that
pile driving is not an abnormally dangerous activity to which strict liability will attach. 
The District Court converted Weeks Marine’s motion into a motion for summary
judgment, and granted it on September 19, 2005.
On September 27, 2005, Hudson filed a summary judgment motion seeking to
have SJPC’s remaining claims dismissed.  Hudson’s motion was based on the theory that
SJPC was precluded from pursuing an action against it premised on Lexington’s
assignment of its right of subrogation.  Hudson also made a demand pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 11 that SJPC withdraw its claims.
On June 30, 2006, the District Court entered an order granting Hudson’s summary
judgment motion.  In its accompanying opinion, the District Court noted that SJPC
submitted a Statement of Damages asserting that the damages it sustained as a result of
the pier section collapses totaled $6.3 million.  It also noted that SJPC had already
recovered $7.3 million from the settlement with Lexington.  The District Court concluded
that although the transfer of the subrogation rights from Lexington back to SJPC was
permissible under New Jersey state law, further recovery by SJPC pursuant to the
6subrogation rights would constitute impermissible double recovery.  The District Court
granted subsequent summary judgment motions by Weeks Marine and Hill against SJPC
on the same grounds.
On August 7, 2006, Hudson filed a motion for sanctions pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 11, seeking legal fees, costs, and expenses. The District Court denied Hudson’s motion
on October 17, 2006, and subsequently dismissed any and all remaining claims that were
pending by or against all parties.
SJPC filed a timely appeal from the District Court’s grant of summary judgment to
Hudson, Weeks Marine and Hill, asserting that the District Court’s decision was in error
because (1) pile driving is an abnormally dangerous activity, and strict liability for such is
not preempted by maritime law, and (2) the assignment of the subrogation rights was
valid.  Hudson filed a timely cross-appeal from the District Court’s denial of Hudson’s
motion for sanctions, asserting that the District Court abused its discretion by failing to
impose sanctions on SJPC.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  After a careful and thorough
review of the record on appeal, we discern no error in the District Court’s rulings on the
summary judgment and sanctions motions.  Accordingly, we affirm substantially for the
reasons set forth in the District Court’s written opinions.  See Laird v. Horn, 414 F.3d
419, 425 (3d Cir. 2005) (reaching its decision “for substantially the reasons set forth by
the district court in its well-reasoned opinion”). 
